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Abstract The foundation of welfare economics is the assumption of Pareto-efﬁciency and its
concept of tradeoffs. Also the production possibility frontier, efﬁciency frontier, nondominated
set, etc., belong to the plethora of tools derived from the Pareto principle. The assumption of
tradeoffs does not address the issue of system design or redesign in order to reduce or eliminate
tradeoffs as a sure characteristic of suboptimal, inefﬁcient system conﬁguration. In this paper
we establish that tradeoffs are not attributes of objectives, criteria or dimensions, as it is ha-
bitually assumed, but are the properties of the very sets of possibilities, alternatives or options
they purport to value and measure. We use De novo programming, through which the so called
feasible set of opportunities can be redeﬁned towards optimal, tradeoffs-free conﬁguration. The
implications of tradeoff-free economics are too vast to foresee and elaborate in a single paper;
they do touch the very foundations of economic thought. Some numerical examples are given in
order to illustrate system-design calculations in linear systems.
Keywords Tradeoffs, multiple criteria, decision making, tradeoffs-free, optimization, De novo
programming, Pareto-efﬁciency, added value
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1. Introduction
“An economic problem exists whenever scarce means are used to satisfy alternative ends. If the
means are not scarce, there is no problem at all; there is Nirvana. If the means are scarce and
there is only a single end, the problem of how to use the means is a technological problem. No
value judgments enter into its solution; only knowledge of physical and technical relationships.”
M. Friedman (1962: 6)
The 20th century was an era of tradeoffs: always giving up something in order to get
something else, rarely attempting to aspire for multidimensional improvement. Af-
ter the crisis of 2008, we are posed to move beyond the zero-sum, tradeoffs-based
economy, i.e., from transferring wealth “from one pocket to another” (in a win-lose
fashion), not creating value for both sides of a transaction. We expect to move to-
wards a nonzero-sum economy where both sides beneﬁt simultaneously (in a win-win
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fashion). Although general growth and progress “lifts all boats”, the transactional eco-
nomy rests on the tenuous assumption of economic tradeoffs between agents, products
or dimensions, re-creating recursively zero-sum macro- and micro-conditions at dif-
ferent levels of “progress”. Consumers (contrary to producers) never prefer tradeoffs
but seek tradeoffs-free (or close to tradeoffs-free) alternatives, products or services, in
order to realize added value through free-market transactions. It is this last problem —
the shift from the tradeoffs-based to tradeoffs-free choices, decisions, strategies, and
economics — that is the subject of the current paper.
We start with the quote from Milton Friedman: it was his transforming thought
that stimulated this author to pursue problems of multiple criteria decision making
(MCDM), Tradeoffs-free economics (TFE), and De novo programming (DNP) and
Knowledge management (KM). In this paper we focus on developing the argument on
the nature of tradeoffs and outline the foundations of tradeoffs-free economics.1
An economic problem is characterized by pursuing multiple criteria over a con-
strained set of decision alternatives. With the pursuit of multiplicity, tradeoffs emerge
and value judgments must be exercised.
A technological problem is characterized by pursuing a single criterion over a con-
strained set of decision alternatives: no tradeoffs are possible (along any single dimen-
sion),2 no value judgments enter, technical computation is sufﬁcient.
Friedman was quite clear about what is the subject of economics: an economic
problem — and that of engineering: a technological problem. It is social, economic
and ﬁnancial “engineering” that is at the core of the worldwide economic crisis.
It is important to note that Friedman’s “single end” refers to any single end: be it an
aggregate function, production function, utility function or any other macro-formula or
composite of initially separate components. A single criterion or objective does not ad-
mit tradeoffs by deﬁnition. A necessary condition for tradeoffs (and value judgments)
is the presence of multiple criteria (or multiple agents) in a vector or portfolio sense,
not in a single-aggregate sense.
In this paper we argue against and beyond Friedman in a number of ways:
(i) The “technological problem” is still the domain of aggregation and utility-based
macroeconomics.
(ii) Engineering itself has moved from the “technological problem” towards the
“economic problem” via multiple criteria based design.
(iii) The “economic problem” has to be extended beyond optimization of the given,
towards designing the optimal.
(iv) There are two distinct concepts of “proﬁt maximization” in economics: maxi-
mizing proﬁt with respect to a given system of resources and — designing the
proﬁt-maximizing system of resources.
1 Friedman was primarily a micro-economist: his formative Price Theory: A Provisional Text, Chicago, IL:
Aldine, 1962, was a staple of our PhD pursuits at the University of Rochester. The messianic and failed
monetary theory and unregulated-market crusades were the products of his later years.
2 Except for now fashionable bankruptcies, where one can be enticed to “trade off” a dollar (invested) for,
say, ﬁfteen cents (returned). Such “swaps” of accepting less for more are gambling, not economic decisions.
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Understanding the role of tradeoffs in economics is not limited to their a priori
acceptance (description-computation-analysis) but should include designing tradeoffs
conﬁguration and their ultimate elimination (prescription-design-synthesis). The role
of economics is not to assume and describe tradeoffs, but to explore and design their
optimal role in decision making and proﬁt maximization of individuals and ﬁrms.
It is quite clear that customers and consumers do not like, do not want and do not
need tradeoffs. There is no economic theory which would postulate human preferences
for tradeoffs. Tradeoffs are forced on consumers as a fact or “necessity of life” and they
are accepted only as such. Tradeoffs are the producer’s concept (so called Or strategy),
brought forth through concentrating on the “technological problem”, i.e. one “key”
dimension of production (cost or quality or speed or...) at a time, forcing consumers
into tradeoffs when choosing a product. Tradeoffs are not the customer’s concept (so
called And strategy) where the focus is clearly on the “economic problem”, i.e. all the
“relevant” dimensions of a product (cost and quality and speed and...).
The tradeoffs-free option is always demanded while the tradeoffs-based option has
always been supplied. The producer’s strategy istraditionally Or, while theconsumer’s
strategy is always And. This preferential dichotomy has already been changing in prac-
tice; it is now going to change in lagging theory as well.
2. Conventional allocation of resources
The main economic problem is clearly the use of limited resources to obtain certain
economic objectives. Linear systems (i.e. ﬁxed production coefﬁcients), especially li-
near programming (LP), represent a good way of demonstrating the optimal allocation
of resources.
The traditional form of LP can be summarized as follows: (i) Fixed technologi-
cal coefﬁcients, making up a matrix; (ii) Resources available speciﬁed, as a vector of
amounts of primary factors which cannot be exceeded; (iii) The objective speciﬁed
in terms of ﬁnal products, together with the optimal algorithm for selecting the most
efﬁcient allocation of resources under the given technological conditions.
One can see that economic considerations were signiﬁcantly compromised to ﬁt
mathematical limits of computing practices of central planning, with no room for mar-
kets, market prices and proﬁts. Linear programming then has an obvious and direct
bearing on the economics of socialism and collectivist planning (von Mises 1935).
Observe that most decisions in LP cannot be computed, but must be taken by some-
one, most likely by the state in the macro or by the planning body in the micro. Avai-
lable resources must be speciﬁed, market prices of resources are not considered, and
multiple criteria have been conveniently replaced by a single objective superfunction
(to be also speciﬁed).
Koopmans (1951) introduced the so called activity analysis which reinforces the
shortcomings of the LP model by stipulating that primary factors are available as re-
sources from outside the system considered, designated as given resources.
Within given resources, a feasible allocation of resources is deemed efﬁcient if
an increase in one output can be achieved only at the cost of a decrease in another
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output. At an efﬁcient point, one ﬁnal product can be increased only at the expense
of the reduced output of another ﬁnal product or at the expense of the increased use
of some input. In this very deﬁnition of the economic efﬁciency we ﬁnd a built-in
notion of the tradeoff. If both products were increased at the same time, the same
solution would be deemed inefﬁcient. The external ﬁxation of resources is implicit
and axiomatic. Feasible points lie in or on a ﬁxed and invariant convex cone in m
dimensions (m products). Who gives this “given” cone? And how?
It is logical that an efﬁcient point (solution) must lie on the boundary of a feasible
set. Therefore, the boundary itself must be ﬁxed together with its tradeoffs. In the
solution of the technological problem of resource allocation, given the technology and
the criterion of efﬁcient allocation, we search to distinguish between efﬁcient and non-
efﬁcient allocations.
Also Samuelson (1965) advances the same simpliﬁcation in a similar vein. He
studies the maximum amount of output which can be produced from any given set of
inputs, in order to establish the so called production function. Again, who gives or how
these inputs are given is not addressed. He even assumes that such function is single-
valued, just because it can have a desired continuous partial derivative of needed order.
Samuelson still deals with the technological — not economic — problem in the sense
of Friedman. Even proﬁt is deﬁned as the difference between gross revenue and total
expenditure, where total expenditure is based on a given production function and given
inputs. If so many things are given in economics (even though not in economy), then
asking who “gives” them, how and why is a legitimate pursuit.3
3. The nature of tradeoffs
The notion of tradeoffs derives naturally from Friedman’s distinction: there can be no
tradeoffs in cases of a single criterion: one cannot “trade off” more for less or better
for worse of the same thing. Consequently, tradeoffs emerge only in cases of multiple
criteria.4
Here we emphasize that tradeoffs emerge: they are not ﬁxed or natural properties
of criteria, attributes or objectives. Tradeoffs are imputed by the set of scarce means
(see Friedman 1962) and its properties. It would be erroneous to treat tradeoffs as if
being the real properties of speciﬁc criteria, objectives or dimensions.
Whether or not there are tradeoffs depends not on alternative ends but only on
scarce means. Although no single-criterion situation can have tradeoffs and therefore
is not a subject of decision making, not all multiple-criteria cases will be characterized
by tradeoffs: tradeoffs emerge or do not emerge on the basis of the means (feasible set
3 It is appropriate to note that when resources are “given” a priori, their market prices become irrelevant
(sunk costs). In all fairness, linear programming, as ﬁrst proposed by Kantorovich in the USSR of the
late 1930s, was appropriate for the times and place. However, why was LP, as a tool of Soviet central
planning, adopted for the post-war “free-market” economies of the West, without considering market prices
of resources, remains unexplained, if not inexplicable.
4 Aggregating multiple criteria (or attributes) into a single super-function (like utility function) forms a
single aggregate criterion and therefore does not pertain to human decision making, as no tradeoffs along
the same function (regardless its complexity) are possible.
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of alternatives) conﬁguration. Tradeoffs are the properties of the means, not of criteria
or objectives.
Yet, popular-science statements about criteria, like “there are tradeoffs between
cost and quality”, are often accepted at their face value, as facts of reality.
What are criteria? Criteria are simply measures or measuring tapes for evaluating
(measuring) objects of reality (things, alternatives, options, or strategies). There is a
fundamental difference between measures and measured objects. Measuring “tapes”
(length, volume, weight, sweetness, etc.) are quite different from apples, oranges and
other measured alternatives.
Therecanbenotradeoffsbetweenmeasures(ormeasuringtapes). Measuresofcost
and quality do not produce tradeoffs, the set of evaluated (measured) choices (alterna-
tives, options) does. It is the conﬁguration (size, shape and structure) of the feasible
set (the measured “object” of alternatives, options and strategies) that is capable of
producing or bringing forth any tradeoffs.
Figure 1. Optimality and Pareto-optimal solutions are the function of the feasible set, not of the




In Figure 1 there are two “conﬂicting” objectives, f1 and f2, both to be maximized
over the changing array of feasible sets. The purpose here is to show that tradeoffs,
conﬂicts, or any other forms of relationship between criteria or objectives, are not
inner attributes of the measures, but are external attributes of the objects measured - in
this case feasible sets, but also any sets of means, constraints, designs, etc.
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It is also quite apparent, that the tradeoff boundary and its shapes, like the non-
dominated set, Pareto-optimal solutions, efﬁciency frontier, productivity frontier, etc.,
are the properties of the set of options (objects of measurement), and not of the set
of measures (criteria of measurements). This is signiﬁcant because in order to truly
maximize any objective function(s), one has to optimize the feasible set; the rest is a
mere valuation and technical computation.
Observe that the identical pair of functions (criteria or evaluation measures) en-
genders tradeoff boundaries of different shapes and sizes, including the no-tradeoffs
cases.
Because different conﬁgurations of means (different feasible sets) give rise to dif-
ferent solution conﬁgurations (different tradeoff or nondominated sets), the question of
securing the best or optimal decision faces a new challenge: Any decision can undoubt-
edly be improved through changing the conﬁguration of means (reshaping feasible sets
of alternatives) whileitclearly cannot be improved through re-computing over anapri-
ori given and ﬁxed set of alternatives. Consequently, modern decision analysis should
be more about reshaping the means in order to attain a tradeoffs-free design as closely
as possible, rather than struggling with unwanted tradeoffs brought forth by inadequate
design of means.
Decision making is more about the scarce means (and the nature of their scarcity)
than about the multiple ends.5 It is more about the process (and its coordination) and
less about its outcome (and its computation). An optimally coordinated and designed
process will lead to an optimal outcome, but not vice versa. In fact, this conclusion is
even stronger: a suboptimal process and poorly designed means must lead to inferior
outcomes. A badly designed feasible set cannot be saved through mere computation,
even if labeled “optimization”.
Decision making therefore means making it through reconﬁguration and design,
not just taking it from a preconﬁgured and ﬁxed set of means. Perhaps decision design
(or decision production) would be more appropriate labels than conventional decision
making.
The very notion of a priori feasibility is dubious in decision design because the
purpose of means reconﬁguration is to expand and redeﬁne feasibility, not to accept
it axiomatically. Innovation is not about doing the same thing better, but about doing
things differently and, more importantly, doing different things. In decision design, it
is not the efﬁciency (computation) but the effectiveness (design) that is of real conse-
quence.
3.1 Pareto-efﬁciency
Modern welfare economics is based on the rather old idea of Pareto-efﬁciency (Pareto
1909), claiming that an allocation is efﬁcient if it is impossible to move to another
allocation which would improve some criteria and worsen no criterion. Based on this
5 Even single ends can be improved through the reconﬁguration of means, although no decision making is
ever needed in single-end “decision making” because there are no tradeoffs. Mere computation (measure-
ment and search) is necessary and sufﬁcient.
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assumption, a striking result can be obtained: in an economy of free markets, the
resulting allocative equilibrium will be Pareto efﬁcient.
How is it possible that economic “efﬁciency” is deﬁned through tradeoffs? That is,
one side, person or criterion can gain only if the other loses? How can they enter into
a free-market transaction without both realizing a gain? Would anybody freely enter a
transaction when one side must lose while the other gains? How can efﬁcient allocation
mean that scarce resources are being squandered (Zeleny 1981) through inefﬁciency?
The key is in a careful wording of the Pareto principle: it holds true, if and only
if consumer tastes, resources, and technology are given. Of course, they never are.
The production possibility frontier (see Figure 2) can be drawn only if the resources
are assumed to be ﬁxed and given. In the reality of free markets, individuals, ﬁrms
and economies continually produce, purchase, destroy and sell resources, incessantly
creating and re-creating the conditions where both sides of a transaction can beneﬁt.
Thus, resources are never given or ﬁxed, but their optimal composition (or portfolio)
is sought through entrepreneurial action. The existence of tradeoffs is the sign of in-
efﬁciency, not efﬁciency. This ancient failure of economics is that correct conclusions
are often drawn from incorrect assumptions.
Because tradeoffs emerge only with multiple criteria, ends, objectives or dimen-
sions, in the case of the utility function (which is a one-dimensional scalar) we have
to shift to agents, i.e. persons holding and adhering to such utilities. The tradeoffs
between agents (decision makers, consumers, providers, etc.) are pre-deﬁned. At the
Pareto-efﬁcient point no free transaction is possible because the gain of one person is
the loss to the other.
In a free market nobody would freely enter a transaction with the prospect of loss
(except when speculating, betting, gambling or stealing). The basic premise of a free
market is that both sides of a transaction must beneﬁt – otherwise such transaction can
take place only in an open (uninhibited) market, facilitated by manipulation, deception,
exploitation, theft or just plain robbery. Tradeoffs-based transactions cannot be carried
out freely by market participants.
Free markets are regulated in order to protect from harm the gains of both sides of
a transaction. Open markets are unregulated (or poorly regulated), do not protect from
harm and let the customer beware (caveat emptor). Free markets are tradeoffs-free;
open markets are tradeoffs-based.
The difference between free and open markets is therefore palpable. The rules reg-
ulating free markets protect the participants from harm and assure that both sides of
a transaction beneﬁt. The under-regulated open markets allow manipulation and de-
ceptions, producing beneﬁts to one side at the cost to the other side (tradeoffs). Open
markets are an easy target of governmental interference and intervention on behalf of
one or the other side. While regulation protects both sides from harm, intervention tilts
the market towards one side: it represents a violation of a free market and thus forms a
breeding ground for political dominance over economics, opening space for national-
ization, socialism, communism, dictatorship and assorted pseudo privatizations of the
“tunneling” variety.
Regulation is a set of rules applied equally and fairly to all market participants in
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order to protect free markets. For example, no food manufacturer may use harmful
additives. Intervention is an explicit act (usually by government) to create non-market
advantage (disadvantage) to one participant at the cost to another participant. For ex-
ample, one auto manufacturer will receive ﬁnancial injection while the others shall not.
The crisis of 2008 has clearly emerged at the intersection of too little regulation and
too much intervention.6
3.2 A note on macro-tradeoffs
The mostfamous macro-tradeoff isthe so called Phillips curve (Phillips 1958). Phillips
came up with an empirical negative tradeoff between the rate of inﬂation and the level
of unemployment. This innocuous curve was later “remade” into a policy tool by
Samuelson and Solow (1960), in order to save the Keynesian system through trading
higher inﬂation for lower average unemployment and vice versa.
Yet, in the long run, there is a natural rate of unemployment which could be com-
bined with any level of inﬂation. The long-run Phillips curve is vertical; inﬂation is
a monetary rather than a real phenomenon, as the stagﬂation of the 1970s conﬁrmed.
Later, Taylor (1979) concluded that there is no long-run tradeoff between the level
of output and the level of inﬂation – but for their variability of ﬂuctuations. Taylor’s
tradeoff has been derived from a policy choice, not from empirical observation. Mere
weighting of central bank objectives (inﬂation and output targets) creates tradeoffs by
deﬁnition; the policy itself “injects” tradeoffs into the economy where no empirically
observable tradeoffs exist.
Yet, the objectives are just measures and no tradeoffs can ever exist between them
per se, as observed in Figure 1.
Just by plotting differentially weighted points we generate an efﬁciency frontier,
showing tradeoffs where none in fact exist. This tradeoff curve will be different for
every assumed economic model of the economy. The idea of policy tradeoff has been
imputed and become embedded in economic policy without any empirical support.
Friedman took advantage of the “missing tradeoffs”, denied two separate and indepen-
dent objectives for the Fed and equally falsely proposed one and only one objective:
to keep the price level steady. He claimed that what is involved is not a tradeoff but a
direct cause-effect.
Friedman’s diagnosis was correct but his cure was not. The lack of empirical trade-
offs among multiple objectives is not explained by assuming single objectives, but by
recognizing that tradeoffs are not the properties of measures, but of the object they
purport to measure.
One could similarly analyze all other models of traditional macroeconomics, well
beyond the scope of this short discourse.
Let us consider, as an example, the traditional productivity frontier, comparing the
delivered non-price buyer value and the relative cost position, as in Figure 2. The
frontier describes the maximum value that a company can deliver at a given cost under
6 The fashionable governmental oxymoron of sufﬁcient regulation but poor enforcement or oversight cannot
hold water. An unenforced or unenforceable regulation is bad or ineffective regulation.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 2 161M. Zelen´ y
the best currently available circumstances. Observe that only companies operating
below the productivity frontier are in a tradeoffs-free environment and can improve
both criteria by moving towards the frontier. Once on the frontier, such companies can
only trade off value against cost, by moving laterally along the frontier, back and forth.
3.3 Productivity frontier
Another key question of economics is whether the individual, ﬁrm or economy could
produce more of some goods while producing no less of other goods? The answer is
always yes and so the society is always wasting resources in production. This pro-
ductive efﬁciency depends on how resources are selected, purchased, organized and
coordinated, i.e. are they assembled and operated in an optimal manner? Resources
are never given (except in centrally planned economies), but must be produced and
purchased to form an optimal portfolio for any economic agent.
In Figure 2, even as the productivity frontier shifts outward (due to technological
improvements and progress), the ﬁrms scramble again for a temporarily tradeoffs-free
environment, only to see such “advantage” quickly dissipated as competitors copy each
other and are forced to face the customer-unfriendly tradeoffs region.






High  Low  Cost 
The situation in Figure 2 is loaded with traditional assumptions. The tradeoffs
between value and cost are assumed to exist a priori: only then can the frontier be
drawn. No differentiation of means and goals is present; companies cannot design
their own frontiers by engaging in different activities and different ways of carrying
them out, etc. This is not how the real world works.
In Figure 3 we capture how companies redesign and reengineer their own processes
and operations (reallocate their resources), so that the frontier (tradeoffs) is eliminated
and the tradeoffs-free environment can be continually expanded and improved upon.
The shaded area (the universe of corporate activities) of Figure 3 represents a distinct
advantage and improvement over the shaded area of Figure 2. The situation in Fi-
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gure 3 is a true, long-term strategic advantage, while the situation in Figure 2 requires
continuous operational improvements and tradeoff choices, without fully satisfying the
customer.






High  Low 
Not only criteria, but the very purposes of decision making are clearly multiple.
One should identify the best (optimal) solution through balancing multiple criteria.
There is no single-criterion decision making, as there is nothing to balance and ev-
erything collapses into mere measurement and search computations. We have also
established that decision making involves not only a priori ﬁxed, given alternatives,
but its most signiﬁcant mode appears to be the design of the best (optimal) set of al-
ternatives. If the decision making process is designed to search and conﬁgure the best
possible set of alternatives, then the mere choice of the best decision is implied and can
be explicated by computation.
There are several rules that have to be respected:
(i) What is determined or given (not just proposed) a priori cannot be subject to
subsequent optimization and thus, clearly, does not need to be optimized: it is
given.
(ii) What is not yet given must be selected, chosen or identiﬁed and is therefore, by
deﬁnition, subject to optimization.
(iii) Consequently, different optimality concepts can be derived from distinctions be-
tweenwhatisgivenandwhatisyettobedeterminedinproblemsolving, systems
design or decision making.
Traditionally, by optimal solution or optimal decision making we implicitly under-
stood maximizing (or minimizing) a single, pre-speciﬁed objective function (criterion)
with respect to a given, ﬁxed set of decision alternatives (situation constraints). Both
the criterion and decision alternatives are given, only the (optimal) solution remains to
be explicated (computed). A good example would be maximization of any aggregate
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function (like multi-attribute utility function and the like) with respect to predeﬁned
alternatives. That is not decision making but computation.
4. The Eight problems of optimization
There are at least eight distinct optimization problems, all mutually irreducible, all cha-
racterized by different applications, interpretations and mathematical/computational
formalisms. They are displayed in Table 1.




Criteria & alternatives Traditional “optimality” MCDM
Criteria only
Optimal design Optimal design
(De novo programming) (De novo programming)
Alternatives only
Optimal valuation Optimal valuation
(Limited equilibrium) (Limited equilibrium)
“Value complex” only
Cognitive equilibrium Cognitive equilibrium
(Matching) (Matching)
Observe that we use the simplest classiﬁcation: single versus multiple criteria
against the extent of the “given”: ranging from “all-but” to “none except”. The tra-
ditional economics, utility and multi-attribute utility theory, characterized by given
alternatives and a single criterion, are displayed as the ﬁrst cell of the ﬁrst row. It
naturally appears to be the most remote from optimal conditions or circumstances for
decision making and optimization, as is represented by cognitive equilibrium (opti-
mum) with multiple criteria (last cell of the last row). Current MCDM appears as the
second cell of the ﬁrst row, etc.
Elaborating the eight individual problems of economics is beyond the subject of
this summary paper. An interested reader can consult relevant works of the author
(Zeleny 1998, 2005).
Thus, to answer the often posed question, ”Are tradeoffs really necessary?”, the
answer is no: tradeoffs are not necessary. In fact, their existence signals economic
and decision inefﬁciency. Pursuing and achieving lower cost, higher quality and thus
improved ﬂexibility, all at the same time, is not only possible but clearly desirable and
necessary in solving current economic problems.
Conventionalwisdomrecommendsdealingwithmultiplecriteriaconﬂictsvia“tough
choices” and a “careful analysis” of the tradeoffs. Lean manufacturing has apparently
eliminated the tradeoffs among productivity, investment and variety. “Quality and low
cost” and “customization and low cost” were long assumed to be tradeoffs, but compa-
nies are now successfully overcoming such “wisdoms”.
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Needlesstosaythatstandardeconomicsparadigm, theeconomicliteratureormulti-
attribute utility theory simply demonstrate that trade-off evaluations and decisions are
frequently painful and almost always tedious. These sources do not question their exis-
tence or contextual independence. Yet, tradeoffs are properties of incorrectly designed
systems and thus can be eliminated by designing better, i.e. optimal systems.
5. Proﬁt Maximization
The difference between optimizing the given (tradeoffs-based) system and designing
the optimal (tradeoffs-free) system is of crucial importance in economics. It goes to
the very core of free-market assumptions: proﬁt or utility maximization by ﬁrms and
individuals.
Indeed, it is impossible to direct ﬁrms solely by the goal of proﬁt-maximization,
with the now dissipated exception of the likes of Goldman Sachs. For most ﬁrms,
there is this mildly annoying but necessary intermediating function of producing and
developing goods and services that people want to buy and that are worth more in the
market than they cost to produce. In other words, a ﬁrm does not just maximize proﬁts,
but must organize and coordinate its resources properly (optimally) so that it can do so
(maximize proﬁts).
Although the literature is rich about deﬁnitions and calculations of proﬁt functions,
it remains silent about how should proﬁts be maximized. Should ﬁrms just do their
best or second best? Should they “maximize” proﬁts even while some resources are
wasted? Should the resources be organized in the proﬁt-maximizing fashion or will
any given resource conﬁguration do?
Then there is the problem of ceteris paribus: can we calculate the marginal product
of a production factor while holding constant the input of all other factors? Is the
assumption of“holding allfactorsconstant except one” rational, as itisbeing promoted
even in better textbooks (Begg et al. 1987)? The fact is that the factors of production
are not independent and we cannot change one while holding all others unchanged.
All factors of production are interdependent and can only be changed in synchrony,
together as a system — as a portfolio of resources. (If a ﬁrm inputs an additional axle,
it has to also get four more wheels and hire an extra driver as well as buy more gasoline,
etc.) Factors of production form a matrix: all entries have to be adjusted as a whole,
not per partes.
It should be clear that rational economic agents can maximize proﬁts in at least
two (see Table 1 for all eight options) fundamentally different and mutually exclusive
modes:
(i) Manage (operate) a given system — so that a proﬁt function is maximized.
(ii) Design an optimal system — so that its management (operation) leads to maxi-
mum proﬁts.
This distinction is independent of the actual formula for proﬁt deﬁnition or calcu-
lation. It is a fundamental distinction between a system given a priori, and a system
designed a posteriori, i.e. after the process of optimization.
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These two forms of proﬁt maximization are clearly not identical. In the ﬁrst case,
one requires doing one’s best and squeezing the maximum possible proﬁts from a given
system. This is known as proﬁt maximization. In the second case, one designs (re-
engineers) resources of a proﬁt-maximizing system so that doing one’s best leads to
maximum proﬁts. This is also proﬁt maximization.
One cannot develop sound economics without deﬁning its basic terms. Proﬁt maxi-
mization, being so fundamental, should not mean two different things. The knowledge,
skills and expertise required are entirely different in the two cases: to coordinate and
manage the given is fundamentally different from coordinating and managing the de-
sign of the optimal.
Because the second case is, ceteris paribus, always superior to the ﬁrst one, we are
facing two strategically different concepts of proﬁt maximization. It does matter — in
business, economics or management — which particular mode of proﬁt maximization
the individuals, corporations or economic cultures prefer: free markets are bound to
reward those who consistently adhere to the second mode of proﬁt maximization —
the optimal design of proﬁt-maximizing systems — while punishing those who just
struggle to do their best with their worst.
Let us now address the second row of Table 1.
6. Single-criterion De novo programming
The traditional resource allocation problem in economics is modeled via standard li-
near programming formulation of the single-objective product-mix problem as fol-
lows:
max cx s.t. Ax ≤ b, x ≥ 0 (1)
That is, given the levels of m resources, b = (b1,...,bm), determine the production
levels, x = (x1,...,xn), of n products, so as to maximize the value of the product mix
cx = åjcjxj. Because all components of b are determined a priori, problem (1) deals
with the optimization of a given system.
When the purpose is to design an optimal system, the following formulation is of
interest:
max cx s.t. Ax−b ≤ 0, pb ≤ B, x, b ≥ 0 (2)
That is, given the unit prices of m resources, p=(p1,...,pm), and the total available
budgetB, allocatethebudgetsothattheresultingportfolioofresourcesb =(b1,...,bm)
maximizes the value of the product mix. We assume that A > 0, p > 0 in (2).
It can be shown that the optimal design problem (2) is equivalent to a continuous
”knapsack” problem (3) below:
max cx s.t. Cx ≤ B, x ≥ 0, (3)
where C = [C1,...,Cn] = pA. For the equivalency of solutions to problems (2) and (3),
see Hessel and Zeleny (1987).


















the optimal solution to (3) is given by (4) and
b∗ = Ax∗. (6)
Observe that under present assumptions this solution is nondegenerate and unique.
Duality. It can be shown that also the dual of (3) determines the solution of the dual of
(2), as is shown in Hessel and Zeleny (1987) and only utilized here.
The dual of (3) is:
min Bv s.t. CTv ≥ c, v ≥ 0, (7)





Furthermore, (6) implies that pb∗ = B; differentiating this equality with respect to b∗
and using (8) gives:
v∗ = [v∗
1,...,v∗
m] = pv∗ (9)
as dual prices for the corresponding constraints of (2). Dual prices of resources are
proportional to their costs, so that contributions of all resources in real terms are equal.
We can now formulate some characteristics of optimally designed product-mix
problems:
(i) The optimal design leads to full-capacity utilization of all resources. Any un-
derutilized resources or excessive resource capacities are the sign of inefﬁcient
allocation and suboptimal performance, as in traditional linear programming (2).
(ii) Dual (shadow) prices of resources are proportional to their costs, so that contri-









yields the well-known result on the marginal rate of input substitution and con-
ﬁrms the optimality of resource allocation.
(iii) Thevalueofnoresourcecanexceeditsvalueintheoptimallydesignedsystem(2).
(iv) In real terms, no resource can be valued above any other. The essence of optimal
design lies in a perfect balance among its resource components.
(v) No reimbursement for an additional unit of a resource can exceed the actual
contribution of this unit to the objective function.
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(vi) Let additional units of resource i, Dbi, involve additional budget expense of DB=
piDbi. Then the optimal allocation of B between various resources must satisfy








(vii) Any deviations from condition (11) imply less-than-efﬁcient allocation.
Numerical Example. A simple numerical demonstration of the optimal-design proce-







where p1 = 30, p2 = 40, p3 = 9.5, p4 = 20 and p5 = 10 are market prices ($ per
unit) of the resources b1 through b5 respectively. Let also B = 2600 and x1 ≤ 6 (e.g.,
maximum demand limitation). Two basic approaches can be used to determine b1
through b5 optimally:
(i) Accounting approach. In an optimally designed system, all of the constraint
inequalities must become equalities. Then,
30b1+40b2+9.5b3+20b4+10b5 = 2600.
Substituting the left-hand sides of constraints, we get:
30(4x1)+40(2x1 +6x2)+9.5(12x1 +4x2)+20(3x2)+10(4x1 +4x2) = 2600,
which is reduced to 354x1 +378x2 = 2600 and thus x1 = 7.35−1.07x2. Maxi-
mize 400x1 +300x2 = 400(7.35−1.07x2) = 2940−426x2 by making x2 = 0.
So, x1 = 7.35, x2 = 0 and b1 = 29.4, b2 = 14.7, b3 = 88, b4 = 0, b5 = 29.4.
If x1 cannot exceed 6, then x1 = 6 and x2 = (7.35−6)/1.07 = 1.26 and thus
b1 = 24, b2 = 19.56, b3 = 77.04, b4 = 3.78, b5 = 29.04.
(ii) De novo approach. Solve the simple LP-knapsack problem:
max 400x1+300x2
s.t. 354x1+378x2 ≤ 2600
By choosing the largest of the two ratios 400/354 and 300/378 and making the
corresponding variable (here x1) as large as possible: x1 = 2600/354 = 7.35.
Because x1 = 6, then x2 = 2600−354(6) = 476/378 = 1.26; the same result as
above is obtained.
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Note. We use “ﬁxed” budget B only as a computational tool in order to establish initial
levels of resources in optimal design. Depending on the outcome, further increases or
decreases in B can be quickly stipulated, following the optimal pattern. That is, also
budget B can (and should) be optimized in a market-priced system. This will become
clearer from optimality-path ratios in Section 7.
Traditional linear programming is of little interest in non-socialist economics be-
cause it addresses a simple technological rather than economic problem (recall Fried-
man) as it “optimizes” an inherently suboptimal system, which is ﬁxed and given a
priori, with no market prices of resources, and a single objective function where no
tradeoffs are possible. Its “optimization” is just a simple computation, its solution
being fully determined by the problem’s structure. No optimization (in the sense of
system improvement) takes place; the system remains unchanged by the calculation,
remaining suboptimal. No optimal design of a system takes place.
In the next section we summarize De novo programming, which designs the opti-
mal portfolio of resources in dependency on market prices and an investment budget,
and with respect to multiple objective functions, redesigns the shape of the feasible set
so that the tradeoffs are fully eliminated. In economic multiobjective problems, the
existence of tradeoffs is always a sure sign of suboptimality, poor system performance
and consumer dissatisfaction.
7. Multiple criteria De novo programming
Let us formulate a linear programming problem (also Zeleny 1990):
max Z =Cx s.t. Ax−b ≤ 0, pb ≤ B, x ≥ 0, (12)
where C ∈ Âq×n and A ∈ Âm×n are matrices of dimensions q×n and m×n, respec-
tively, b ∈ Âm is the m-dimensional unknown vector of resources, x ∈ Ân is the n-
dimensional vector of decision variables, p ∈ Âm is the vector of the unit prices of m
resources, and B is the given total available budget.
Solving problem (12) means ﬁnding the optimal allocation of B so that the cor-
responding resource portfolio b maximizes simultaneously the values Z = Cx of the
product mix x.
Obviously, we can transform problem (12) into:
max Z =Cx s.t. Vx ≤ B, x ≥ 0, (13)
where Z = (z1,...,zq) ∈ Âq and V = (V1,...,Vn) = pA ∈ Ân.
Let zk∗ =max zk, k =1,...,q, be the optimal value for the k-th objective of problem
(13) subject to Vx ≤ B, x ≥ 0. Let Z∗ = (z1∗,...,zq∗) be the q-objective value for the
ideal system with respect to B. Then, a metaoptimum problem can be constructed as
follows:
min Vx s.t. Cx ≥ Z∗, x ≥ 0. (14)
Solving Problem (14) yields x∗, B∗(=Vx∗) and b∗(= Ax∗). The value B∗ identiﬁes
the minimum budget to achieve Z∗ through x∗ and b∗.
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Since B∗ ≥ B, the optimum-path ratio for achieving the ideal performance Z∗ for a




We establish the optimal system design as (x,b,Z), where x = r∗x∗, b = r∗b∗ and
Z=r∗Z∗. The optimum-path ratio r∗ provides an effective and fast tool for the efﬁcient
optimal redesign of large-scale linear systems.
There are two additional types of budgets (other than B and B∗). One is Bk
j, the
budget level for producing the optimal xk
j with respect to the k-th objective, referring
back to the single-objective De Novo programming problem.
The other, B∗∗, refers to the case q ≤ n (the number of objectives is less than the
number of variables). If x∗∗ is the degenerate optimal solution, then B∗∗ =Vx∗∗ (see
Shi 1995). It can be shown that B∗∗ ≥ B∗ ≥ B ≥ Bk
j, for k = 1,...,q.

















They lead to six different policy considerations and optimal system designs. Compara-
tive economic interpretations of all optimum-path ratios are dependent on the decision
maker’s value complex (Zeleny 1998).
Numerical example. The following numerical example is adapted from Zeleny (1984,
1986):









We assume, for simplicity, that the objective functions z1, z2, and z3 are equally
important. We are to identify the optimal resource levels of b1 through b6 when the
current unit prices of resources are p1 = 0.75, p2 = 0.60, p3 = 0.35, p4 = 0.50, p5 =
1.15 and p6 = 0.65. The initial budget B = $4658.75.
We calculate Z∗ = (10916.813,18257.933,12174.433) with respect to the given
B($4658.75). The feasibility of Z∗ can only be assured by the metaoptimum solution
x∗ = (131.341,29.683,78.976) at the cost of B∗ = $6616.5631.
Because the optimal-path ratio r∗ = 4658.75/6616.5631 = 70.41, the resulting
x = (92.48,20.90,55.61) and Z = (7686.87,12855.89,8572.40). It follows that the
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optimal portfolio b, with respect to B = $4658.75, can be calculated by substituting x




b4 = 1444.64 lb(17)
b5 = 640.07
b6 = 1299.55
If we spend precisely B = $4658.8825 (approx. $4658.75) we can purchase the opti-
mum portfolio of resources (17) at current market prices, allowing us to produce x and
realize Z in criteria performance. No better solution can be realized for given amount
of money.
8. Added value
One of the most common examples of agent tradeoffs is the win-lose tension between
the producer and the consumer. Because the price paid is still a main economic cate-
gory, its increase brings higher added value (and proﬁts) to the producer at the cost of
a lowered added value to the consumer. The lowering of the price paid has the oppo-
site effect. So there are constant tensions between producers and consumers in trading
off total added value between themselves, rather than increasing its apportioned levels
for both at the same time,7 as would free-market transactions require: both parties
to a transaction must beneﬁt in order to enter into the transaction freely, i.e., without
coercion or deception.
Decisionmaking isaprocess and itscoordination of actionstagesorphases, aswell
as their sequencing and structural conﬁguration, is a matter of knowledge and skills.
It is this knowledge (purposeful coordination of action) that adds value to the means
or inputs. One of the dominant inputs is information. That is why a clear distinc-
tion between information (input) and knowledge (process) is so crucial in economics.
Knowledge, according to Hayek (1937, 1945), is the main concept in free-market eco-
nomics.8 While knowledge is the demonstrated capacity of coordinating action, in-
formation is its symbolic description, a digitizable record of past, present and future
actions. As such, information per se is of limited value (rapidly becoming a commo-
dity, often accessible for free): it acquires value only through being internalized in the
decision-making process and transformed into knowledge, i.e. only through action and
the value of its outcome (Zeleny 2005).
7 This ancient struggle over the price paid is exempliﬁed by the Turkish bazaar and its vigorous haggling
over price as a ﬂexible tool for dividing ﬁxed added value between competing agents. In more advanced
economies, prices paid become relatively ﬁxed and the potential for increasing added value for both sides is
thus created.
8 We could add trust as the second most important concept, as current crisis has demonstrated in abundance.
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All this is rather straightforward as “uninternalized” information becomes just a
background clutter, white noise or information overload. Information is thus being
transformed, at an increasing rate, into a sort of exformation, or informational waste.
While information (and exformation) becomes plentiful, human attention span is be-
coming a scarce resource.
In contrast, there can never be any “knowledge overload” and so the only effective
and safe way to improve performance and decision making is through knowledge, i.e.
through a purposeful coordination of production and decision-making processes.
8.1 What is Added Value?
Knowledge is measured by the value created by coordination of effort. Action and
processes add to materials, technology, energy, services, information, time and other
inputs used or consumed. Knowledge is measured by added value.
In any business (and human) transaction, value has to be added to both participants
(or sides): to the provider and to the customer. Adding value to both is what makes the
transaction satisfactory and sustainable: it creates a free market.
There are two kinds of value to be created: value for the business and value for
the customer. Both parties must beneﬁt: the business — in order to produce it; the
customer — in order to purchase it. In the global age it is precisely this business-
customervaluecompetitionthatisemergingasthehardestandthebusiestbattleground.













  Wages and salaries 
  Profit 
In Figure 4 we explain the process of creating new value. This is crucial for mea-
suring knowledge and for the identiﬁcation and assessment of innovation.
First, the customer pays for the service or product: the price paid. The producer
subtracts the cost incurred, including all direct and indirect materials and services pur-
chased. The difference is the added value for the ﬁrm (producer, provider). This added
value can also be interpreted as the value of knowledge engaged in producing the ser-
vice or product. In order to pay wages and salaries, the production process and its
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coordination must generate added value. Added value is the only source of wages,
salaries and proﬁts.
If the added value does not cover the wages and salaries, then they must be corre-
spondingly lowered. If no value has been added, then the value of knowledge is zero
and no payment can be attributed to it. The business must add enough value in order to
cover at least the salaries and wages of its workers and managers. If even more value
has been created, then proﬁts can be realized, up to the price paid.
The customer, of course, must be willing and ready to pay more for the service/pro-
duct than he actually paid. The maximum price the customer would be willing to pay
must exceed the price the producer has asked for. The difference is the added value for
the customer.
If there is no value for the customer — the maximum price is lower than the price
to be paid — then the customer would not purchase the service or product. In a com-
petitive market, the customer pays money only for the value received, i.e. the value for
the customer.
The proper entrepreneurial and long-term strategy must eliminate the tradeoff be-
tween the ﬁrm and its customer. Such strategy concentrates on increasing the ma-
ximum price while lowering the costs — both at the same time, in a tradeoffs-free
fashion. Both sides are then bound together in a mutually beneﬁcial process of pro-
ducing maximum added value. The price paid can remain relatively constant as long
as both sides’ beneﬁts are increasing, avoiding the tradeoffs-based environment and
decision making. Periodically, the optimal system is redesigned so that the portfolio of
resources and its coordination maintains tradeoffs-free added value for both (maximum
proﬁts are implied), as the example in Section 7.
9. Conclusions
The areas of economics where tradeoffs-free thinking and economic calculus of De
novo optimization can be applied are numerous. We cannot elaborate on all aspects
of tradeoffs-free economics in this paper, but point out a few such areas with some
references.
For example, the efﬁciency frontier of portfolio analysis (Markowitz 1952, 1959)
is based on the assumption of tradeoffs between expected value and standard deviation
of uncertain returns — i.e. tradeoffs between two moments of the same probability dis-
tribution of returns. Lerner (1971) has criticized variance-based measures of risk while
Colson and Zeleny (1979) proposed a three-dimensional measure of risk. Problems
of conﬂict resolution have often been mismanaged through preserving the tradeoffs
(the win-lose conditions) which are the very cause of conﬂict. Yet, the tradeoffs-free
conﬂict dissolution methodology has been proposed (see e.g. Zeleny 2005).
Tradeoffs are often assumed between key policy objectives. The Phillips curve
postulates tradeoffs between unemployment and inﬂation (see Section 3.2), but simi-
lar arguments can be advanced for growth and inﬂation or growth and the balance of
payments. Such tradeoff assumptions severely limit policy options even though argu-
ments can be made for tradeoffs-free alternatives in all such cases. Also, quantitative
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economic policy based on game theory provides a useful application. The ﬁeld of
games with multiple (or vector) payoffs is only referenced here (Zeleny 1976) due to
the lack of space. Traditional, scalar-payoffs based games are no longer sufﬁcient for
economics. Similarly, environmental regulation would beneﬁt from a dynamic version
of De novo programming and its optimal-path ratios.
Another area of tradeoffs is the false notion that through environmental regulation
we have traded off a considerable portion of our national wealth for costly environ-
mental protection. This can only be true if the cost of using harmful energy sources is
very low. Once the price of such sources becomes sufﬁciently high, the growth and en-
vironmental protection go hand in hand. Not all regulation is harmful to growth: much
regulation encourages innovation, increases the supply of public goods, and stimulates
the development of new businesses. It is the abundance of (governmental) market in-
tervention, not regulation, we should be concerned about.
Tradeoffs are the properties of available options (feasible sets), not of criteria, goals
or objectives (measures). This has been the main message of this paper.
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